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Babič A, Basco A, Casotto C, Crowley H, 
Dols ̌ek M, Fotopoulou S, Galbusera L, 
Giannopoulos G, Giardini D, Kakderi K, 
Karafagka S, Matos J P, Pitilakis K, 
Rodrigues D, Salzano E, Schleiss A J 
Reviewer: Mignan A 
Publishing editor: Tsionis G 
2016 
EUR 28344 EN 
This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science 
and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking 
process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither 
the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that 
might be made of this publication. 
JRC Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
JRC104650 
EUR 28344 EN 
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-64606-5 ISSN 1831-9424  doi:10.2788/10912 
Print ISBN 978-92-79-64607-2 ISSN 1018-5593  doi:10.2788/984814 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 
© European Union, 2016 
The reuse of the document is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the original meaning or 
message of the texts are not distorted. The European Commission shall not be held liable for any consequences 
stemming from the reuse. 
How to cite this report: Iervolino I, Anastasiadis A, Argyroudis S, Babič A, Basco A, Casotto C, Crowley H, 
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Abstract 
Loss assessment of critical infrastructures (CIs) subject to natural hazards is 
fundamental to stress tests. The systemic approach that lifelines require for performance 
modelling is an open research topic, given their logical and physical complexity. The 
Work Package 4 (WP4) of STREST focused on the guidelines for the vulnerability 
assessment of critical infrastructures categorized as: 
A Individual, single-site infrastructures with high risk and potential for high local 
impact and regional or global consequences; 
B Distributed and/or geographically-extended infrastructures with potentially high 
economic and environmental impact; 
C Distributed, multiple-site infrastructures with low individual impact but large 
collective impact or dependencies. 
This reference report documents and summarizes the results of STREST WP4 via a series 
of applications and procedures (mostly referring to the seismic hazard case because of 
the level of advancement of research with respect to other natural hazards). The main 
attempt was to treat different CIs in a homogeneous framework derived and adapted 
from the well-known performance-based earthquake engineering developed for 
individual structures. From this effort it may be concluded that it seems possible to apply 
a unique logical framework to different CIs exposed to different natural hazards; 
nevertheless the performance/loss models for the key vulnerable components of each of 
them are still mostly lacking. 
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JRC Luca Galbusera 
 Georgios Giannopoulos 
AMRA Iunio Iervolino 
Ernesto Salzano 
Anna Basco 
AUTH Kyriazis Pitilakis 
Stella Karafagka 
Stavroula Fotopoulou 
Kalliopi Kakderi 
Sotiris Argyroudis 
Anastasios Anastasiadis 
EPFL José P. Matos 
Anton J. Schleiss 
Introduction 
 1 
 
1. Introduction 
Loss assessment of critical infrastructures (CI) subject to natural hazards has been one 
of the key tasks of the STREST project since loss susceptibility is one of the key 
attributes of resiliency (see Stojadinovic et al., 2016). Given that natural hazard (e.g., 
earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, etc.) assessment is somewhat consolidated to date, the 
main research needs are on CI vulnerability (e.g., response and consequence) modelling. 
In fact, while vulnerability assessment for individual structures (i.e., buildings) is also 
advanced, the systemic approach that lifelines require has not been fully addressed to 
date. This is why WP4 of STREST focused on the guidelines for the vulnerability 
assessment of CIs. Since each system logic requires a specific approach to the 
performance assessment, the CIs were categorized in three classes, as: 
A Individual, single-site infrastructures with high risk and potential for high local 
impact and regional or global consequences; 
B Distributed and/or geographically-extended infrastructures with potentially high 
economic and environmental impact; 
C Distributed, multiple-site infrastructures with low individual impact but large 
collective impact or dependencies. 
Class A is the case of critical facilities (such as power plants) where the hazard has to be 
typically assessed for a point-like location, and the vulnerability of the facility requires to 
consider a system capable of domino and cascading effects, which may affect the 
community/area surrounding the facility. In these cases, direct damage is typically a 
negligible fraction of the loss while the triggered effects (e.g., an industrial accident) 
generate the main loss.  
Class B is the case of the spatially-distributed infrastructures such as utility distribution 
networks. This kind of system needs hazard and vulnerability assessment reflecting the 
systemic (logically interconnected nature of the system) as well as its non-point-like 
spatial configuration (i.e., regional or multi-site hazard). For this type of systems, local 
failure may imply lifeline interruption for a large served community and downtime is 
usually the main cause of loss, even if locally there may be triggered accidents, for 
example because of hazardous material release, such as in gas distribution networks.  
Finally class C is the typical case of building portfolios where individual hazardous events 
may trigger accumulated losses due to multiple (several) local failures and business 
downtime. The contemporaries losses in a building portfolio may be large such that the 
portfolio has to be considered as a critical infrastructure. The key example is that of 
industrial districts, where the individual components of the infrastructure are the 
individual industrial facilities. 
This reference report provides practice-oriented guidelines for the performance and loss 
(i.e., vulnerability assessment) of CI typologies A to C via a series of exploratory 
applications/procedures. To this aim, the remainder of this document starts with the 
discussion of the taxonomy of CIs with respect to natural hazards. The taxonomy serves 
to list the key components for performance and loss assessment of each CI typology. 
Moreover, it serves to specify the required model for vulnerability assessment and the 
interfacing variables of these models. The interfacing variables link the vulnerability to 
hazard on one side (i.e., a natural event’s intensity measure), and on the other side with 
the loss assessment (i.e., an engineering demand parameter to which associate 
damage). The taxonomy also serves to list the logical and physical dependencies of the 
components of the infrastructure with respect to the natural event considered. 
Subsequently, quantitative and standardized procedures and tools for consequence 
analysis are described for selected test cases of the three CIs’ categories, putting more 
emphasis on those cases where new models have been developed by the STREST 
Project. In particular, a series of class A infrastructures are considered: (i) an oil 
refinery; (ii) a concrete dam; and (ii) a port infrastructure. Earthquake and tsunami 
hazards are those considered. Case (i) considers, as the main consequence, the possible 
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industrial accident triggered by the damage induced by a natural event, case (ii), the 
inundation eventually following structural failure of the dam, and case (iii), business 
interruption due to the port unavailability after a natural event. With respect to class-B 
CIs, the document mainly addresses seismic performance/loss assessment of distributed 
(utility) networks summarizing the results of previous large research efforts in this 
direction, which allowed to generalize the approach in the seismic case. The considered 
CI are distribution networks, which may be considered lifelines, as their downtime 
affects the served community (why the port infrastructure appears both in class A and B 
is briefly discussed at the beginning of chapter 3). Class C is addressed with respect to 
seismic hazard only and refers to a portfolio of industrial buildings constituting an 
industrial district. In this case, structural, non-structural, and content performance/loss 
modelling is key. Final remarks close the report. 
Taxonomy of the critical infrastructures 
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2. Taxonomy of the critical infrastructures 
2.1 Summary of STREST classification of critical infrastructures 
The STREST project is covering three classes of critical infrastructures (CI): 
A Individual, single-site infrastructures with high risk and potential for high local 
impact and regional or global consequences; 
B Distributed and/or geographically-extended infrastructures with potentially high 
economic and environmental impact; 
C Distributed, multiple-site infrastructures with low individual impact but large 
collective impact or dependencies. 
A number of case studies were considered for each of these CI classes, and despite their 
differences, they all share similar elements that are exposed to risk. In many cases, they 
include components from different systems, interacting to ensure the supply of the CIs’ 
products and/or services. The STREST taxonomy describes (with a common language) 
the main components that are present in the following systems: 
o Hydropower systems 
o Electric power systems 
o Waterfront components 
o Earthen/rockfill embankments 
o Roadway systems 
o Railway systems 
o Industrial warehouses 
o Cargo handling / storage systems 
o Fire-fighting systems 
o Natural gas distribution and storage systems 
o Oil refinery processing and storage systems 
o Hydrocarbon distribution and storage systems 
o Hydropower systems 
o Liquid fuel systems 
o Waste-water systems 
STREST Deliverable 4.4  (2015)describes in detail the STREST taxonomy - that builds 
upon the taxonomy developed in the SYNER-G project (Hancilar and Taucer, 2013) - for 
classifying the individual components listed below that can be found within these 
different systems, such that each CI can be described in a harmonized way:  
o Appurtenant structures 
o Backup power (generator) 
o Breakwaters  
o Bridge abutments  
o Bridges 
o Buildings 
o Building contents 
o Compensation reservoir 
Taxonomy of the critical infrastructures 
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o Cranes 
o Distribution Circuits  
o Electricity Lines 
o Fire-hydrant 
o Gas Pipelines 
o Gravity Retaining Structures 
o Mooring and Breasting Dolphins 
o Oil / Gas Storage Tanks 
o Oil Pipelines 
o Other Pipelines 
o Other Storage Tanks  
o Piers  
o Pipeline Station 
o Power plant 
o Pump equipment  
o Pumping Station 
o Pumping Plants 
o Refinery process components 
o Road pavements (ground failure) 
o SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition system) 
o Sheet Pile Wharves  
o Substations 
o Switchyard 
o Telecommunication centre 
o Tracks 
o Transmission lines  
o Treatment plant 
o Water Pipelines / Conduits 
o Water Storage Tanks 
o Water Tunnels 
STREST Deliverable 4.4 presents each of the above components, the CI/system within 
which they can be found, and then two columns for the classification: the first provides a 
list of generic typologies, and the second gives a more detailed list of so-called 
classification parameters. Some elements (such as pumping stations or cranes) can be 
comprehensively described with a list of generic typologies, and sometimes this can be 
further expanded using some additional information that can be described using the 
classification parameters. Other elements (such as buildings and pipelines) instead have 
a very large number of potential typologies and so generic typologies are not available, 
and instead they require a classification system based on the classification parameters, 
such that ad-hoc typologies can be produced.  
Taxonomy of the critical infrastructures 
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2.2 Vulnerability factsheets 
Once the various components at risk were identified and described through the STREST 
taxonomy, the next critical step that was taken within the project was the identification 
of fragility/vulnerability characteristics of each component, and the intensity measure 
types needed to describe the hazards to which they are exposed. This information was 
collected through vulnerability factsheets that were compiled by the leaders of each cast 
study, and which included the following information: 
o Component needing a vulnerability model and its coordinates 
o Hazard to which the component is vulnerable 
o Primary Engineering Demand parameter (EDP1), i.e. most important parameter 
controlling structural response 
o Secondary Engineering Demand parameter (EDP2) (if any) 
o Limit States of interest and consequences of failure. What defines failure and 
undesired performance conditions triggering loss? Does the structure deteriorate 
in multiple events (e.g., aftershocks)? 
o Primary preferred hazard intensity measure (IM1), i.e. most important analysis 
input parameter characterizing the potential of the natural hazard 
o Secondary preferred hazard intensity measure (IM2) (if any) 
o Site-specific or regional? Are IMs required at a single location or at multiple 
locations? 
o If a vulnerability model for the component did not exist, the case study leaders 
had to clarify that it would be developed in the project? 
o Stochastic modelling / uncertainty treatment in the model: What is the tool to 
address uncertainty in vulnerability of the component? E.g. Monte Carlo 
assessment, First Order Reliability Method etc. 
o Analysis method for the performance assessment of the component: What 
method is used to evaluate vulnerability (e.g., analytical through non-linear 
dynamic analysis, empirical through observational data from other events…)? 
o Interdependency: A preliminary assessment of whether the performance of the 
component is affected or affects other components of the same CI or of other CIs? 
2.3 Dependencies factsheets 
Inter- and intra-dependencies highly influence the performance of all kinds of complex 
facilities, as described in the dependencies factsheets provided in STREST Deliverable 
4.4. A summary of the main outcomes of these factsheets is summarized below.  
A survey of multiple dependencies of the CIs was carried out, accounting for the 
consequences of cascading failures and loss and availability assessment for supply-
chains-like systems. Multi-infrastructure stress tests at a regional scale are performed on 
the basis of loss propagation and reciprocal impacts caused by failures. Dependencies 
eventually to be accounted for by the STREST approach and in the case study 
applications were thus identified. The factsheet includes a description of the existing 
intra-dependencies (between the components of each CI) and inter-dependencies 
(between the infrastructures of the CI and other networks) based on the SYNER-G 
project approach. Three different priority levels (i.e. crucial, important and secondary) 
and two types of interactions (i.e. direct and indirect) were considered. Crucial and 
important dependencies have been defined taking into consideration the methodology 
that will be implemented for their simulation. As a general remark, direct dependencies 
are in most cases classified at least as crucial and/or important. It is noted that only 
Taxonomy of the critical infrastructures 
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interactions between components of different infrastructures and subsystems have been 
considered.  
The most dependencies have been found in the hydrocarbon pipeline system in Turkey 
(HDRC), the harbour of Thessaloniki (HBR) and the Gasunie national gas storage and 
distribution network in Holland (GPN), where 110, 102 and 88 dependencies have been 
recognized respectively. For the large dams in Switzerland (DAM) and the oil refinery 
and petrochemical plant in Milazzo (REF), 64 and 31 dependencies have been provided, 
while the least dependencies (7) are defined in the industrial district in Italy (IDA). 
In general, geographic (GEO) and physical (PHY) dependencies are the most common in 
all of the CIs. On the other hand, societal (SOC) and logical (LOG) interdependencies 
have not been defined in any CI. Restoration interactions (RES) are not present in the 
REF and IDA, while Sequential (Seq) dependencies are not present in DAM and IDA. 
Information (Inf) dependencies are identified only in HBR and HDRC, while general (Gen) 
ones are defined only in DAM and GPN.  
This observation is related to the number of interacting assets that have been considered 
in each case, as in general, the ranking of dependencies per CI follows the amount of 
interacting components. However, the “dependency index” which here is defined as the 
ratio between the number of assets and the total number of dependencies in each CI, 
shows that the most dependent assets are in the industrial district (IDA), which is then 
followed by REF, DAM, HDRC, HBR and GPN. This is related to the way that each CI is 
working, the kind and number of different operations performed, as well as the number 
of components available to perform one task, e.g. the existence of redundant 
components minimizes the “dependency index”.  
Concerning the importance of priorities (in the framework of stress test), it is observed 
that HDRC has the most crucial dependencies, while HBR, GPN and IDA have less such 
dependencies. The most dependencies of second priority are defined in DAM and HDRC. 
On the other hand, HBR, GPN and HDRC have the most dependencies of third priority. 
This is related also in a way to the chosen approach of analysis for each CI, and the 
system operations that are of major importance to the whole system functionality and 
are going to be included in the methodology analysis framework.  
Finally, in total, the most crucial dependencies (first priority) are the physical and 
geographic ones, while numerous geographic, physical dependencies are also considered 
in some cases as third priority dependencies, together with restoration dependencies. 
The “priority index”, which here is defined as the ratio between the number of 1st, 2nd 
and 3rd priorities to the total number of dependencies for each type of interaction, shows 
that most of the dependencies are of 3rd priority. In particular, all the substitute (SUB) 
dependencies and most of the INF, Geo and Res dependencies are of 3rd priority. Such 
kind of interactions may in some cases have extremely adverse effects to the CI 
performance, and consequently to the served area, but since the subject of 
dependencies between CIs is rather a new research field, there are currently no available 
methods for their simulation and quantification. 
Site-specific high consequence facilities 
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3. Site-specific high consequence facilities 
The Deliverable 4.1 has been specifically aimed at producing quantitative and 
standardized procedures and tools for the consequence analysis of two selected single-
site CI classes, namely industrial CIs (CI-A1) and dams (CI-A2), starting from intensity 
measures/scenarios related to natural events produced in WP3 (see STREST European 
Reference Report 2).  
The task was also intended to produce vulnerability functions for the selected CIs, from 
the component level (e.g., element-based-fragility) to the system level. The probabilistic 
vulnerability models accounted, if appropriate, for time-variant issues (e.g., aging and 
damage accumulation due to repeated shocks) in a consistent manner.  
This report describes the main results of task 4.1 and is divided in three main parts, 
namely: T4.1-CI-A1: ENI/Kuwait oil refinery and petrochemical plant, Milazzo, Italy, 
followed by AMRA, T4.1-CI-A2: Large dams in the Valais region of Switzerland followed 
by EPFL, and T4.1-CI-B1: Port of Thessaloniki followed by AUTH. It is noted that while 
the CI-B1 is actually classified as distributed and/or geographically-extended 
infrastructures with potentially high economic and environmental impact (see Section 4), 
some of its components can be part of individual, single-site infrastructures (e.g. a single 
port pier), therefore, vulnerability functions produced for certain components (i.e. 
buildings and cranes) of the port system are presented in this section. 
All the definitions and concepts described below use the same taxonomy as in 
Deliverable D4.4. Accident case studies and lessons learned from natural hazard impact 
on refineries, petrochemical plants, large dams and port areas can be found in STREST 
Deliverable D2.3 that discusses lessons learned from recent catastrophic events 
(Krausmann, 2011). For the three sections (CI-AI, CI-A2 and CI-B1) the proposed 
development may be sketched in three main steps and sub steps as reported in Fig. 3.1. 
 
Fig. 3.1  The process flow for the vulnerability function developed in D4.1 for the single-
site industrial equipment 
Details on seismic hazard and near-source analysis can be found in Deliverable D3.3 of 
the STREST project. Tsunami Hazard is a measure of the potential for a tsunami to occur 
at a given site. More details can be found in Deliverable D3.1 of STREST project. 
1. Natural 
hazard
•Characterization of 
natural event
• Definition of the intensity 
measure
• Definition of hazard
2. Hazard of critical 
infrastructure
• Structural 
characteristics
• Technological 
hazard
• Substance hazard
3. Vulnerability 
model
• Fragility
• Definition of 
vulnerability 
functions
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3.1 CI-A1: ENI/Kuwait oil refinery and petrochemical plant, 
Milazzo (IT) 
3.1.1 Technological hazard 
Within the chemical process industry, each equipment is characterised by different 
structural features and functions. In addition, any chemical process is intended to 
convert raw materials or intermediate products to final products. Hence, the hazard of 
the substance, during processing or storage, has to be evaluated, too. The primary 
sources that have the propensity to cause accidents can be determined either using the 
safety report of the plant or through existing risk assessment documentation. However, 
the selection of relevant hazardous equipment is an important step of the risk analysis 
procedure because it allows the reduction of the costs and time needed for the 
application of the method.  
For the aims of this project, equipment have been categorized in three types with 
respect to the design standard: i) Atmospheric equipment (storage tank and process); ii) 
Pressurised equipment (cylindrical buried; cylindrical over-ground; spheres); and iii) 
Pipeline system. The following sections will be devoted to these three types of equipment 
only. 
Atmospheric storage tanks are constructed worldwide based on API 650 (2015) and are 
geometrically characterised as vertical cylinder. Other atmospheric process equipment as 
distillation towers, separation units, or cyclones, are also designed with similar 
procedures however with slender geometry. For the structural point of view, all these 
types of equipment are generally built with carbon or stainless steel, with typical 
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure and corresponding failure pressure of few milli-
bars. Shell thicknesses range from 5 mm to about 1 cm for some sections of jumbo 
tanks. 
Pressurised equipment is often adopted for very hazardous substances and it is 
geometrically characterised as cylindrical (buried or over-ground) or spherical. The 
thickness, and the corresponding design pressure, are clearly larger than atmospheric 
equipment and may reach several centimetres for small equipment like chemical 
reactors. 
Finally, the pipeline system within the installation may be aboveground or buried. Any 
release from natural-event triggered ruptures may result in a severe scenario. Pipelines 
may be continuous or segmented and are typically built from carbon or stainless steel 
when transporting hazardous or noxious substances.  
Quite clearly, the technological hazard cannot neglect the hazards associated with the 
intrinsic chemical and physical hazards related to the processed or stored substances. 
Equipment items processing or storing flammable/toxic, highly flammable/toxic or 
extremely flammable/toxic substances according to the Classification, Labelling and 
Packaging Regulation (CLP-Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008), have surely to be considered 
as relevant sources of accidental events. Interestingly, studies have shown that 
earthquake-triggered structural damage involving water tanks is very similar to tanks 
containing hazardous materials and their behaviour can be described by a very similar 
methodology.  
Besides, the physical state (gas, liquid, solid) and the operating conditions, which 
depend on the specific analysed process, are also of extreme importance. Eventually, a 
hazard matrix has been first developed and may be adopted for risk assessment (Table 
3.1). 
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Table 3.1  Technology hazard matrix. 1: low - 4: high 
 Liquefied gas Overheated Liq Gas Cryogenic liq Liquid 
Pressurised 4 3 3 2 1 
Atmospheric 4 3 2 2 1 
Pipeline 3 2 2 2 1 
This result may be used for prioritizing the case study and the consequence assessment, 
as described in the Quantitative Risk Analysis developed in Deliverable D5.1 of the 
STREST project, but must be crossed with the chemical hazard. 
To this aim, the REACH Regulation (the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals of the European Union, adopted to improve 
the protection of human health and the environment from the risks that can be posed by 
chemicals) is useful, if added to the information given by the Seveso Directives (e.g. Dir 
2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control 
of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently 
repealing council directive 96/82/EC) and with CLP (Guidance to Regulation (EC) No 
1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging (CLP) of substances and mixtures, 
Version 4.1, June 2015, ECHA-15-G-05-EN). Indeed, the CLP informs on the hazard 
characteristic for any substance, and the Seveso Directives includes a list of chemicals 
and related threshold amount to consider the same chemicals as dangerous for workers, 
population and environment.  
3.1.2 Vulnerability model 
In the framework of a performance-based analysis related to natural events, damage 
should be classified according to fixed levels, generally called Damage States. For 
instance, HAZUS (HAZUS-MH MR4, 2009) provides the Damage States for many types of 
structures, components and groups of structures. Each Damage State DS is related to 
synthetic and representative intensity measures of the observed natural hazard.  
In the case of NaTech analysis, different limit states related to the loss of containment 
from the given equipment, rather than structural vulnerability, need to be developed. 
These limit states are often defined as Risk State RS in the existing literature (Campedel 
et al., 2008; Salzano et al., 2009).  
For each damage or risk state, a vulnerability function has been defined based on 
earthquake or tsunami intensity parameters. These functions have been retrieved from 
scientific literature or, if not existing, directly developed within the STREST project. The 
vulnerability functions were adopted in existing tools for the quantitative risk assessment 
and for the scope of CI-A1 task.  
When equipment is designed, any good engineering practice takes into account the 
possible impact of natural events like snow, wind or earthquake. Some requirements for 
structural response of equipment when subjected to earthquakes are e.g. compulsory in 
early design phases.  
With reference to the specific case of construction of atmospheric storage tanks, for 
instance, API 650 (2015) takes into account two response modes, for either anchored or 
unanchored tanks, with respect to earthquakes: a high frequency response to lateral 
ground motion of the liquid contents that moves in unison with shell, and a relatively 
low-frequency response of the liquid tank content that moves in the fundamental 
sloshing mode. The two modes lead to an overturning action of the tank.  
Quite clearly, structural engineers can use more complex methodologies as Finite 
Element Analysis (see e.g. Eurocode 8 (EN 1998-1, 2003)). These tools are technically 
and economically sustainable only when a single case is considered or when designing 
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new equipment with important impacts on economy, but they become hard to be 
adopted when performing risk analysis of large installations or for industrial areas 
(parks), with many equipment items to be analysed.  
To this regard, it is worth noting that the cited structural design codes or more simplified 
methodologies often do not take into account active or passive prevention and mitigation 
systems and are always addressed to the structural integrity (that is, to avoid the 
collapse of the structure) of the item, hence they do not take into account the integrity 
of connections or of piping. Indeed, the main aim of early phase design is typically the 
loss of serviceability and economic issues for system recovery, whereas few concerns are 
related to NaTech accidental scenarios, which may possibly involve the population and 
environment located in the surrounding of industrial installation. Eventually, these 
methodologies are not applicable to quantitative risk assessment of large industrial 
installations and the use of simplified empirical equipment vulnerability models based on 
observational data is necessary. Besides, the number of test cases to develop from the 
natural event to the possible scenarios (fire, explosion, dispersion of toxic substances), 
combined with the elevated number of equipment does not allow the use of even simple 
numerical lumped parameter models or distributed parameter models except with large 
economic and time efforts. 
In the development of such tools, the damage classification proposed by HAZUS 
guideline (HAZUS-MH MR4, 2009) might be adopted and extended to any natural event 
in the framework of NaTech risk assessment. More specifically, limit states for structural 
damage (damage state, DS) may be defined for structural damages, though with specific 
reference to industrial purposes. According to HAZUS damage classification (1997), 
slight damages to structures have been defined as DS2, moderate damages as DS3, 
extensive damages as DS4 and total collapse of structure as DS5. The term DS1 refers 
to insignificant damage. 
As suggested in the previous section, the framework of industrial risk assessment 
suggests however the adoption of an even more simplified approach based on a limited 
number of discrete damage states (DS). In the present document and with the aim of 
vulnerability ranking, a lower number of damage states needs to be identified as a 
possible consequence for any equipment loaded by an earthquake (Campedel et al., 
2008; Salzano et al., 2009). The definition of DS will be given for each specific 
equipment in the following. 
Furthermore, in quantitative risk assessment, “Risk States” (RS) have to be defined in 
order to obtain a measure of the quantity and rate of hazardous substances released 
from containment systems, following the structural damage of industrial equipment 
(Salzano et al., 2003; Salzano & Cozzani, 2007; Campedel et al., 2008) due to the 
impact vector characterizing the natural event.  
As in the case of DS, also RS may vary between the total absence of release and the 
moderate release of hazardous substance, up to the extensive loss of containment. Quite 
clearly, the significance of RS may depend strongly on the equipment and substance 
type. In the case of pressurized equipment containing toxic substances, for instance, the 
consequences of both moderate and extensive release may be quite similar, because – 
due to pressurisation - even relatively small failures of shell structure may produce large 
damage and similar loss of containment (which depends only on loss section, due to 
choking flow). For any RS value, a correspondent accident scenario (fire, explosion, and 
toxic dispersion) may be associated. This passage is not described in this deliverable and 
is part of the more general application of quantitative risk assessment. 
The damage state DS and the risk state RS can be correlated by simple analysis, which 
depends on the specific equipment type. Furthermore, starting from the definitions, 
industrial equipment vulnerability may be defined by correlating the intensity of the 
impact vector for the specific natural event to the probability of a given limit state (RS), 
for each category of equipment, by means of “fragility” curves: 
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 (3.1) 
where Φ is complementary cumulative normal distribution function, µ and σ are 
lognormal mean and standard deviation values, and IM is the intensity measure, i.e. the 
specific value of severity parameter that characterizes the natural event. 
Eventually, for the generic natural event, given the equipment category (e.g. 
atmospheric or pressurized), we can define a NaTech vulnerability function P for each RS 
state as: 
i i
IM
P RS RS |IM P RS RS |IM h(IM)dIM           (3.2) 
In other terms, the marginal RS probability of any equipment conditional to the 
occurrence of event may be assessed by considering the corresponding hazard h of the 
natural event. The annual rate of RS exceedance is then computed by using the annual 
rate of occurrence. 
Cost/benefit analysis and time effectiveness lead always to the introduction of strong 
simplifications in the analysis in order to obtain suitable tools for risk assessment. An 
even more simplified approach may be required when vulnerability ranking is needed. 
Threshold values for the natural intensity IMnat,thresh may be useful, for any RS defined 
above, in order to produce a univocal value of the natural hazard severity for the sake of 
prioritisation of different equipment and process systems. To this aim, the use of probit 
analysis is normally adopted for their mathematical definition. Details of the procedure 
for probit analysis are reported elsewhere (Finney, 1971). 
3.2 CI-A2: Large dams in the Valais region of Switzerland 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Regardless of their specific characteristics, which may vary markedly from case to case, 
large dams typically operate by storing substantial volumes of water in their upstream 
reservoir. The release of that water to downstream areas is normally controlled 
according to operational guidelines and targets. In view of that, in order to correctly 
frame risk and vulnerability assessments for dams, one should consider, beyond the dam 
body, the reservoir, the appurtenant structures (e.g. spillways, bottom outlets, or 
hydropower systems) and, most importantly, the downstream areas potentially affected 
by floods. 
In fact, following a dam failure, typically characterized by an uncontrolled release of the 
reservoir, a large amount of water travels downstream in the form of a dam-break wave. 
Such waves travel extremely fast and have enormous eroding power, as well as 
transport capacity. The impact that a dam failure may have is dependent on a number of 
factors, perhaps more relevantly failure mechanism, volume of the reservoir, height and 
type of dam, the occupation of land downstream, and the exposure of the population to 
the dam-break wave. Despite these dependencies, impacts are generally 
acknowledgeable. 
Large dams have historically led to a small number of catastrophic disasters. With 
failures taking place in well-defined locations – the dam body or even specific sections of 
it – the death toll of the worst dam failures ranged from hundreds to staggering numbers 
of tens of thousands of people (i.e. Banqiao embankment dam, Ru River, Henan 
Province, China, August 1975; the number of direct and indirect victims is believed to 
range from 30000 to some unfathomable 230000). The localized nature of the failures 
along with the significant consequences they may have justify that large dams are 
classified as critical infrastructures of class A. 
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Most countries promote a deterministic approach to dam safety assessment. Designers’ 
focus is placed in large measure on structural responses and hydraulic behaviours, which 
are nowadays predicted with great accuracy. Dams, like many other complex systems, 
can be vulnerable to unforeseen combinations of relatively common events, either 
independently or following a major hazard, bringing about a failure. Not all of these 
events are necessarily captured by the deterministic approach; there is an advantage in 
moving towards and increased reliance on probabilistic frameworks. This section 
advocates for that. 
On one hand, the implementation of probabilistic frameworks is not directly compatible 
with the use of detailed numerical models – these take much too long to run in order to 
be used in the large number of cases necessary to support a probabilistic analysis. On 
the other hand, the preparation and use of detailed numerical models adapted to the 
specific large dam under study is necessary and should not be abandoned. Indirect ways 
of combining both are needed. 
Recognizing that the dam-reservoir system is intrinsically dynamic and subject to 
numerous interactions between different components of the dam, the reservoir, and 
hazards, a probabilistic framework based on the Generic Multi-Risk (GenMR) framework 
(Mignan et al. 2014) aimed to assess the overall risk associated with a conceptual large 
alpine embankment dam operating for a period of one year. In other words, beyond 
looking at isolated sources of risk or reference scenarios, this methodology sought to 
gain insight on the role of hazard interactions and the dynamical nature of the system. It 
was proven effective at that and, it is believed, may be a valuable asset in the 
vulnerability assessment of large dams. 
The study of the dam-reservoir system and how failures can be brought about is 
undoubtedly important. Also extremely relevant is to assess what are the consequences 
to downstream areas once a dam-break wave is released. It is thus recommended that 
vulnerability assessments for large dams rely on probabilistic frameworks that 
successfully come to terms with the complexity and dynamic nature of a typical dam-
reservoir system but, at the same time, handle the uncertainty that shrouds the 
downstream impacts of failures and the vulnerability of activities, land uses and 
populations to dam-break waves (Fig. 3.2). 
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Fig. 3.2  Proposed framing of vulnerability and loss assessment for large dams. The 
analysis of potentially affected areas is downstream adds to the simulation of the dam 
system. The relationship between both “blocks” is achieved through flood wave routing. 
3.2.2 Vulnerability model 
Damage states 
Although an element’s integrity can range anywhere from 0 to 100%, particular damage 
states considered for CI-A2 were focused on the dam and foundation element and 
spillway. They are a gross simplification of what should be done for a real vulnerability 
assessment study of a large dam and were used in order to test the potential of the 
GenMR probabilistic framework with applied to this type of infrastructures. Functionality 
of hydraulic elements was assumed to be proportional to their integrity, down to a 
chosen threshold below which the element is considered inoperable (in practical terms it 
cannot be used to regulate reservoir levels). 
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Assuming that, at 50% integrity, the dam is no longer capable of holding the reservoir, 
damage states were quantified as follows: 
o Dam not damaged: integrity between 95 and 100%, 
o Dam mildly damaged: integrity between 90 and 95%, 
o Dam tolerably damaged: integrity between 80 and 90%, 
o Dam severely damaged: integrity between 70 and 80%, and 
o Dam critically damaged: integrity between 50 and 70%. 
The spillway was associated with a single damage state – spillway severely damaged – 
that corresponds to integrity below 85%. Below this level, the spillway was considered 
inoperable. Not damage states per se, but relevant nonetheless, are the integrity 
thresholds below which the remaining outflow structures are assumed not to function. 
These amount to 90%, for the bottom outlet, and 50% for the hydropower system. 
Risk states 
Risk states aim to represent undesired outcomes of a certain hazard or a combination of 
previous events. Firstly, the issue of a drawdown order is represented; it signals the 
attempted reduction of the reservoir level by all means necessary in order to prevent 
eventual further damage to the dam. Drawdown orders were assumed to be issued if the 
dam is either severely or critically damaged or the spillway is severely damaged. 
Secondly, the occurrence of moderate and “full” overtopping failure modes was rendered 
possible. Moderate overtopping occurs when the water level over the crest is marginal 
(lower than 50 cm on a limited section of the crest) and, although the dam endures 
some damage, a full breach is not necessarily developed. In opposition, “full” 
overtopping implies the failure of the dam. Finally, failures can be a consequence of 
damage accumulated by the dam and foundation that is not always linked to 
overtopping. Other hazards that may lead it are, for example, earthquakes or internal 
erosion. Knowing the cause of failure is relevant for outflow hydrograph estimations. 
3.2.3 Vulnerability functions 
Earthquakes 
Vulnerabilities to earthquakes for the different elements considered in the dam-reservoir 
system are depicted in the next figures. Again, these constitute a gross simplification of 
best-practices and follow an inverse reasoning that assumes compliance to Swiss 
regulations. In a real study where a probabilistic framework is resorted to, it is 
recommended that vulnerability functions are derived from detailed numerical models; 
the specificity and importance of most large dams should more than justify custom 
modelling work. 
As embankment dams are recognized to be particularly resilient to earthquakes, it was 
assumed that a 10 000 year return period earthquake would damage the structure 
without prompting the release of the reservoir, finally failing for a return period of 
approximately 1 000 000 years. Resorting to a similar reasoning, the spillway’s 
vulnerability was defined such that, for a 10 000 year return period earthquake, it 
remains functional while, for a 475 years return period event, it withstands little 
damage. Given the range of different building solutions for spillways, it is also 
recommended that these elements’ vulnerabilities are individually evaluated prior to 
practical applications of the methodology. 
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Fig. 3.3  Vulnerability curve of the dam and foundation (left) and of the spillway element 
(right) to earthquakes 
 
Fig. 3.4  Vulnerability of the bottom outlet element (left) and of the hydropower system 
(right) to earthquakes 
The bottom outlet and hydropower systems, including mechanical equipment, were 
modelled as being more vulnerable to the earthquake hazards than the spillway, 
particularly due to the risk of gates jamming. Again, there was little information found in 
literature that contributes to the quantification of the vulnerabilities of such elements to 
earthquakes. The parameters of the applied log-normal curves, applied to PGA, are 
shown in Table 3.2. Stemming from earlier discussion, numbers such as these should be 
calculated specifically for every large dam. 
Table 3.2  Parameters of the log-normal vulnerability functions to earthquakes (PGA). 
Specific for the conceptual dam system under study 
Element Location parameter (μ) Shape parameter (σ) 
Dam and foundations -2 0.23 
Spillway -1.85 0.18 
Bottom outlet -1.95 0.19 
Hydropower system -1.6 0.29 
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Internal erosion 
Only the dam and foundation element are considered vulnerable to internal erosion 
events. Internal erosion is a process which, after initiated, tends to develop very fast. In 
fact, as the more of the dam’s material gets eroded, less resistance there is to the flow. 
This leads to more water exiting the dam body and ever more material being eroded, 
ultimately leading to a full breach being formed. 
Due to this progressive behaviour, which is likely – but not guaranteed – to end in a 
failure of the dam, it is not straightforward to specify the hazard’s intensity measure and 
corresponding vulnerability function. As such, the intensities that were used to 
characterize the hazard are assumed to be proportional to the damage endured by the 
structure. The curve is particularly steep in order to capture the evolving nature of the 
hazard, but although based in engineering judgement, its applicability is admittedly 
debatable and should be the target of further investigation. The admitted parameters for 
this log-normal were μ of -12 and σ equal to 1. 
Equipment malfunction 
The equipment malfunction hazard affects the bottom outlet and hydropower system. It 
represents the possibility of gates being jammed, under maintenance, or inoperable due 
to motor failures. Unlike for the previous vulnerabilities, damages associated with 
equipment malfunction are limited, as neither of the systems are expected to be 
completely destroyed by such an event. The proposed functions, based on statistics for 
mechanical equipment failure rates (Pohl, 2000), are depicted in Fig. 3.5 and detailed in 
Table 3.3. It should be stated, however, that such failure rates are heavily dependent on 
maintenance efforts and operability checks and, thus, are expected to vary widely 
between countries and even between dam operators. 
Moderate overtopping 
Finally, the vulnerability of the dam to moderate overtopping was modelled as a uniform 
random variable, being that for every moderate overtopping event it suffers a damage of 
5 to 20%. 
  
Fig. 3.5  Distribution of the damage induced to the bottom outlet element by equipment 
malfunction (left) and to the hydropower system by equipment malfunction (right) 
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Table 3.3  Parameters of the log-normal vulnerability functions to malfunctions. Specific 
for the conceptual dam system under study 
Element 
Location 
parameter (μ) 
Shape parameter 
(σ) 
Cut-off value 
(damage, %) 
Bottom outlet -12 4 25 
Hydropower system -11 3.8 30 
Downstream structures and infrastructure 
The vulnerability of downstream structures and infrastructures was modelled on the 
basis of inundation parameters. Unfortunately, there is little published information on the 
specific vulnerability of buildings to dam-break waves. As such, in the scope of this 
problem, vulnerabilities are based on publications made for natural floods and tsunamis, 
the latter particularly interesting as they are expected to – similarly to dam-break waves 
– carry a large amount of debris and travel fast. 
Inundation depth 
There is a plethora of different potential sources for vulnerability functions to floods 
based on inundation depth. Notably the Hazus-MH software (Department of Homeland 
Security Division Federal Emergency Management Agengy Mitigation Division 2006), 
includes over 700 functions adapted to different buildings and contents, vehicles, etc. 
As put forward above, however, dam-break floods differ from natural ones in several 
aspects and, perhaps, a better proxy for damages associated with dam-break waves 
results from vulnerabilities derived for the tsunami hazard. In addition, vulnerability 
functions depend on the building practises in each country and are marked by great 
uncertainty, varying widely among publications (e.g. de Moel & Aerts, 2011). Adequate 
vulnerability functions for Switzerland were not found. 
An example of vulnerability functions specific for tsunamis derived from the project 
SCHEMA following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Tinti et al., 2011). Beyond the 
vulnerabilities derived in the scope of SCHEMA, a wealth of information on the fragility of 
buildings to tsunami action ensued from the 2011 Great East Japan tsunami (Suppasri et 
al., 2013). Fragility curves published from reinforced concrete structures were employed 
on the present case study. The curves derived by Suppasri et al. (2013) for two-story 
reinforced concrete buildings are illustrated in Fig. 3.6 for six damage classes. These 
are: 
a) Minor damage; 
b) Moderate damage; 
c) Major damage; 
d) Complete damage; 
e) Collapsed; 
f) Washed away. 
Additionally to presenting curves for several types of building material and height, the 
authors highlight that building height plays an important role in observed damages, with 
constructions with more than three stories much less likely to be washed away, 
regardless of the building material. 
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Fig. 3.6  Fragility curves derived by Suppasri et al. (2013) for two-stories reinforced 
concrete buildings. 
Flow velocity 
While water height is relatively easy to assess following a flood event, water velocity is 
more difficult to estimate. Partly due to this, the vast majority of flood-related 
vulnerability and fragility curves are based on the former. According to Kreibich et al. 
(2009), however, although water height constitutes a good predictor of structural 
damage to residential buildings, flow velocity works better as an independent variable 
for assessing damages to road infrastructure. 
Even for buildings, it can be argued that accounting for flow velocities is important. In 
fact, for natural floods, the estimation of damages based on inundation depth alone 
implicitly assumes that either flow velocities remain below levels that pose a risk of 
structural damages or that flow velocity behaves as a function of water height. Dam-
break waves can attain flow velocities that largely surpass those of natural floods and 
display highly unsteady behaviour, with steep rise and descent of water levels. 
Consequently, none of the implicit assumptions can be applied to them. 
As an example, for the current case study and making use of only a fraction of the 
simulated data one can see that, although a correlation between simulated inundation 
depth and flow velocity indeed appears to be clear, there is ample scattering of the 
results (Fig. 3.7). Because no fragility curves were found for road infrastructure affected 
by dam-break waves or tsunamis, four fictitious fragility curves were assumed in order 
to test the model (Fig. 3.8 and Table 3.4). These correspond to minor (a), moderate (b), 
major (c), and complete damage (d). 
Site-specific high consequence facilities 
 19 
 
 
Fig. 3.7  Scatter plot depicting inundation depths and flow velocities simulated by a 2D 
model applied to the dam-break problem 
 
Fig. 3.8  Fragility curves admitted for road infrastructure 
Table 3.4  Parameters of the log-normal fragility curves admitted for road infrastructure. 
Have been admitted solely for the purpose of illustrating the methodology 
Damage state Location parameter (μ) Shape parameter (σ) 
A -2 1 
B -0.25 0.8 
C -1 0.6 
D 1.8 0.5 
3.2.4 Integrating the assumed vulnerability models 
All described vulnerabilities were integrated after performing millions of simulations of 
the dam-reservoir system using the GenMR framework. Downstream impacts were 
assessed by a number of detailed numerical hydraulic simulations of the valley below the 
dam with a 1D-2D coupled model (BASEMENT, Vetch et al. 2005). Because each of these 
simulations takes hours to complete – that being hardly compatible with a probabilistic 
framework – machine learning models were used to derive inundation parameters at any 
place of the valley as a function of the dam’s outflow. Examples of the results obtained 
from the application of the methodology to buildings and roads are shown in Fig. 3.9 and 
Fig. 3.10. 
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Fig. 3.9  Map of damages to reinforced concrete buildings of two stories corresponding to 
a specific dam-break event. Adapted from Salzano et al. (2015). 
 
Fig. 3.10  Map of damages to roads corresponding to a specific dam-break event. 
Adapted from Salzano et al. (2015). 
Through this work it was shown that probabilistic frameworks can be used with a number 
of advantages, particularly in what concerns the information that can be gotten by 
disaggregating results and the effects of uncertainty. 
The novelty of the work and the added value of its recommendations are not bound to 
the vulnerability functions that were used or the depth to which specific processes have 
been handled. It is, in fact, quite simple in both regards and admittedly less elaborate 
than what best practices recommend for real-case studies. The novelty of what was done 
lies in the way in which the dynamical nature of the dam-reservoir system was modelled 
and in the fact that it successfully depicted interactions developed among a number of 
different hazards and system states. Also, it invested in transposing probabilistic results 
downstream and thus embracing the non-linearity of the vulnerabilities of buildings and 
roads to dam-break waves. 
Finally, the work this section builds upon came short of studying loss of live. In what 
dam failures are concerned that is perhaps the most important aspect to define. 
Site-specific high consequence facilities 
 21 
 
Although loss of live due to dam failures continues to be difficult to estimate and, 
therefore, does deserve additional study, here a conscious decision was made to 
contribute towards the parts of dam safety analysis that forcibly come before estimating 
how many lives may be lost in the event of a failure. Better knowledge of failure rates 
and their predominant mechanisms, as well as added insight on the estimation of 
inundation parameters such as maximum water depths, peak flow velocities, and time of 
arrival of the flood will certainly contribute to improved loss of live estimates. 
3.3 CI-B3 - Port infrastructures of Thessaloniki, Greece 
3.3.1 Definition of limit damage states 
The definition of realistic limit damage states is of paramount importance for the 
construction of fragility curves. The selection of appropriate engineering demand 
parameters (EDP) to correlate with the selected IM (inundation depth) is a challenge, as 
a suitable EDP has not yet been established in literature. When a building response to 
tsunami comprises structural damage, damage states can be classified using the same 
schemes used for structural damage triggered by an earthquake (Bird et al. 2005). 
However, the use of a global damage index such as the interstory drift is not appropriate 
to be used as a tsunami EDP as the expected deformed shape and damage mechanism 
of the structure impacted by a tsunami is quite different from that of the same structure 
subjected to ground shaking. Thus, a local damage index in terms of building’s material 
strain can be used as it shows an improved correlation with structural damage 
(Macabuag et al., 2014). Four limit damage states (LS1, LS2, LS3 and LS4) are defined 
based on nonlinear static analyses (both seismic pushover and tsunami time history 
analyses) for the various typologies of the buildings and the crane, engineering 
judgment and the available literature (e.g. HAZUS-MH (2009), FEMA (2004), Crowley et 
al. (2004), Fotopoulou and Pitilakis (2013a; 2013b)). They describe the exceedance of 
minor, moderate, extensive and complete damage of the structures. According to FEMA 
(2004), “Steel Light Frames” structures are mostly single story structures combining 
rod-braced frames in one direction and moment frames in the other. Due to the 
repetitive nature of the structural systems, the type of damage to structural members is 
expected to be rather uniform throughout the structure. Consequently, warehouses are 
considered as “Steel Light Frames” structures. The limit state values finally adopted are 
presented in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. 
In order to minimize the uncertainties associated with the selection of the appropriate 
damage state limits, nonlinear static analyses including seismic pushover and tsunami 
time history analyses were performed for the different analysed structures to define 
structure-specific limit state values (in terms of strains) for each damage state.  
Regarding the RC buildings, first a seismic pushover analysis was conducted to obtain a 
preliminary estimation of the damage states defined on the capacity curve. An iterative 
procedure followed to derive, for each damage limit state, the steel and concrete strains, 
which yield the corresponding roof displacement on the curve. It was seen that for all 
analysis cases, steel strain (εs) gives more critical results. Hence, hereafter, the 
proposed limit damage states were defined in terms of steel strain. In particular, for the 
MRF models with bare frames the first limit state was specified as steel bar yielding while 
for the infilled ones the infills cracking was assigned as the first limit state and steel bar 
yielding as the second one. For the rest limit states, mean values of post-yield limit 
strains for steel reinforcement are suggested. For the dual models, the steel strain limits 
considered in MRF models cannot be used to characterize the extensive and complete 
damage of the dual systems, as they lead to lower levels of top displacement on the 
capacity curve. Thus, increased values of steel strain limits were adopted. It should be 
noted that the behaviour of the dual models when considering or not infills does not 
change considerably. This is to be expected considering that the contribution of the infills 
Site-specific high consequence facilities 
22  
 
to the total stiffness of the model is small compared to that of the shear-wall. Based on 
the above considerations, the same limit strain values were specified for both bare and 
infilled dual structures. The same procedure is followed for the definition of the limit 
state values for the steel structures, namely the warehouse and the crane.  
The definition of limit states on the seismic capacity curves for the different RC building 
typologies and the steel structures considered can be found in details in the full STREST 
D4.1 (Salzano et al. 2015). Then the tsunami nonlinear static analyses are performed to 
verify (or potentially slightly modify) the selected limit state values. Detailed results of 
the Deliverable Report are not reported here for the sake of brevity.  
It must be noted that the tsunami capacity curves are not extracted from a single 
nonlinear static analysis as for the seismic case but from the total number of the tsunami 
nonlinear static time history analyses. This is done considering that the location and 
amplitude of the applied tsunami forces changes as a function of the inundation depth. It 
is worth noticing however that the seismic and tsunami capacity curves present 
consistent results predicting very similar damage state limits. 
The selected limit state values finally adopted for the tsunami vulnerability analysis are 
presented in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 for the RC buildings and the steel structures 
respectively.  
Table 3.5  Definition of limit states for the different RC building typologies considered 
Limit states 
Steel strain (εs) 
MRF bare frames MRF with infills Dual with/without infills 
Limit state 1 
0.002 
(Steel bar yielding) 
0.0007 
(infills cracking) 
0.002 
(Steel bar yielding) 
Limit state 2 0.0125 
0.002 
(Steel bar yielding) 
0.0125 
Limit state 3 0.025 0.010 0.04 
Limit state 4 0.045 0.020 0.08 
Table 3.6  Definition of limit states for the warehouse and the crane 
Limit states 
Steel strain (εs) 
Warehouse Crane 
Limit state 1 
0.00112 
(Steel bar yielding) 
0.00125 
(Steel bar yielding) 
Limit state 2 0.0125 0.0125 
Limit state 3 0.03 0.03 
Limit state 4 0.055 0.055 
3.3.2 Construction of fragility curves 
Fragility curves describe the probability of exceeding predefined levels of damage under 
a tsunami event of a given intensity. The results of the nonlinear numerical analysis 
(inundation depth - steel strain values) are used to derive fragility curves expressed as 
two-parameter time-variant lognormal distribution functions.  
The following equation gives the cumulative probability of exceeding a DS conditioned on 
a measure of the tsunami intensity IM: 
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where, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, IM is the intensity 
measure of the tsunami expressed in terms of inundation depth (in units of m), 
i
IM  and 
β are the median values (in units of m) and log-standard deviations respectively of the 
building fragilities for each damage state i and DSi is the damage state. The median 
values of inundation depth respectively corresponding to the prescribed damage states 
are determined based on a regression analysis of the nonlinear static analysis results 
(inundation depth - steel strain pairs) for each structural model. More specifically, a 
second order polynomial fit of the logarithms of the inundation depth - steel strain data, 
which minimizes the regression residuals, is adopted in all cases. Fig. 3.11 shows 
indicatively the derived inundation depth – steel strain relationships for the MRF 2-storey 
infilled building. 
 
Fig. 3.11  Inundation depth- steel strain relationships for the MRF 2-storey infilled 
building 
The various uncertainties are taken into account through the log-standard deviation 
parameter β, which describes the total dispersion related to each fragility curve. The 
primary sources of uncertainty which contribute to the total variability for any given 
damage state are those associated with the capacity of each structural type and the 
demand. The log-standard deviation value in the definition of the capacity is assumed to 
be equal to 0.3 for low code buildings (FEMA, 2004) and 0.25 for the modern jumbo 
crane. The uncertainty in the demand was considered by calculating the dispersion of the 
logarithms of inundation depth - steel strain simulated data with respect to the 
regression fit. Under the assumption that these two log-standard deviation components 
are statistically independent, the total log-standard deviation is estimated as the root of 
the sum of the squares of the component dispersions. The herein computed log-standard 
deviation β values of the curves vary from 0.33 to 0.59 for all structural models. Table 
3.7 presents the lognormal distributed fragility parameters (median and log-standard 
deviation) in terms of inundation depth, and illustrates the corresponding sets of fragility 
curves for the various RC building typologies and for the warehouse and the crane 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Site-specific high consequence facilities 
24  
 
Table 3.7  Parameters of fragility functions 
Structural system 
Median inundation depth (m) Dispersion β 
LS1 (m) LS2 (m) LS3 (m) LS4 (m)  
MRF 2-storey bare-frames 1.85 2.38 2.56 2.71 0.43 
MRF 2-storey infilled 1.16 1.57 2.11 2.33 0.37 
Dual 2-storey bare-frames 1.14 1.57 1.83 1.99 0.40 
Dual 2-storey infilled 0.96 1.27 1.46 1.57 0.44 
MRF 4-storey bare-frames 2.66 3.30 3.52 3.70 0.33 
MRF 4-storey infilled 1.81 2.43 3.33 3.74 0.40 
MRF 9-storey bare-frames 4.01 4.97 5.30 5.57 0.39 
MRF 9-storey infilled 2.27 3.81 5.49 6.19 0.35 
Warehouse 2.20 2.79 2.97 3.10 0.57 
Crane 13.14 15.37 16.16 16.69 0.59 
It may be observed that, the higher the height of the RC building, the lower its 
vulnerability. It is also shown that the low-rise and mid-rise models with infills are more 
vulnerable compared with the corresponding models with bare frames. This trend also 
holds true for the high-rise MRF for the exceedance of slight and moderate damage. This 
is in accordance with the FEMA guideline, which recommends the design of vertical 
evacuation buildings with break-away walls or open construction in the lower levels to 
allow water to pass through with minimal resistance. 
In contrast, when extensive or complete damage of the structures is anticipated, the 
bare RC frame is expected to sustain larger damages in comparison with the 
corresponding infilled one. This could be attributed to the height of the building, which 
makes its behaviour unpredictable for higher levels of damage. 
Furthermore, it is seen that the low-rise dual RC models are more vulnerable compared 
to the corresponding MRFs. The latter could be related to the concentration of large 
tsunami forces in shear walls. This is the reason why FEMA recommends that for the 
design of vertical evacuation structures, shear walls should be oriented parallel to the 
anticipated direction of tsunami flow to reduce associated tsunami forces. 
Regarding the steel structures, i.e. the warehouse and the crane, it is seen that although 
the numerically calculated limit state values are the same for all damage states, they 
present, as it would be expected, a completely different behavior in terms of fragility. In 
particular, the warehouse presents fragility values that are generally closer to that of the 
low-rise and mid-rise MRF RC buildings while the crane, as it would be expected, is 
significantly less vulnerable compared to all building types analyzed. It is also observed 
that the derived curves for the warehouse are very close together. Thus, once the 
warehouse has yielded, it will very rapidly also attain the post-yield limit states. 
The representative comparisons of the herein developed numerical tsunami fragility 
curves with the corresponding empirical ones of Suppasri et al. (2011) (Indian Ocean 
tsunami in Thailand) and Suppasri et al. (2013) (Great East Japan tsunami) are 
represented in detail in STREST D4.1 (Salzano et al. 2015). However, a good agreement 
between the curves is observed in general. The existing differences can be attributed to 
the fact that the empirical fragility curves chosen for comparison were constructed based 
on hazard-damage relationships from previous different tsunami events (i.e. the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in Thailand and the Great East Japan tsunami) and/or expert judgment. 
In addition, the proposed fragility curves refer to low code buildings in contrast to the 
empirical ones that include different design codes. Therefore, only preliminary 
comparisons of the herein numerically developed fragility curves with the empirical ones 
can be made as the latter are highly specific to a particular seismo-tectonic, geotechnical 
and built environment. 
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4. Distributed critical infrastructures 
The impact of several recent destructive events to critical infrastructures (CIs) 
highlighted the need to develop guidelines for the performance and consequences 
assessment of geographically distributed non-nuclear CIs exposed to multiple natural 
hazards and low probability-high consequence (LP-HC) events. To accomplish this, 
quantitative and standardized procedures and tools for consequence analysis of those 
CIs are presented. Some key components of this assessment are: the identification of 
hazards to which the CI components are exposed, the vulnerability models that evaluate 
the extent to which a particular component can withstand the impact of the hazard and 
the systemic analysis that measures the performance of the infrastructure under given 
hazards.  
During the same event, different hazard intensities may be experienced at the different 
locations where components are located. Such intensities cannot be assumed 
independent, since they are caused by the same source event. Also, different 
components may be sensible to different intensity measures (IMs) related to the same 
hazard (e.g. for ground shaking, to PGA and PGV), or to secondary hazards (e.g. PGD for 
geotechnical hazards). Thus, it is necessary to model the potential spatial correlations of 
the hazard intensities as well as the spatial cross-correlation between different IMs. 
STREST ERR2 (Cotton et al. 2016) provides guidelines for harmonized hazard 
assessment for high-consequences events.  
Fragility or vulnerability functions should be estimated both for single adverse events 
and for cascades of adverse events. While the evaluation of the seismic vulnerability has 
received over the past years a significant attention (e.g. Calvi et al. 2006; Pitilakis et al. 
2014a), the vulnerability assessment of structures related to other hazards (e.g. 
tsunamis, floods, landslides etc.) is still limited (e.g. Karafagka et al. 2016; Fotopoulou 
and Pitilakis, 2013). Therefore, there is a need to expand the vulnerability and risk 
assessment methods developed for seismic hazard to other hazards. In the framework of 
STREST (Kakderi et al. 2015), a comprehensive review of fragility functions for the 
critical components of the selected geographically distributed CIs was carried out and 
new fragility curves were developed where necessary. It is noted that with the fragility 
functions only the potential physical damages of the components of the systems are 
considered (the functionality of either the elements or the whole system is not 
considered). The damage states (physical damage) of the components are usually 
correlated with functionality levels and restoration times. To assess the vulnerability and 
performance at system level, except for the previously described methods, different 
complementary approaches should be followed, i.e. a connectivity analysis, a capacity 
analysis or a fault-tree analysis (e.g. Pitilakis et al. 2014b).  
Complex systems exhibit patterns, outcomes, and properties not present in any of their 
individual elements. In this case, the performance of the whole infrastructure (CI facility) 
should be based on integrated models and evaluation measures of critical infrastructure 
systems. The quantitative measure of the performance of a system and its elements 
when subjected to a hazard is given by Performance Indicators (PI’s). They express 
numerically either the comparison of a demand with a capacity quantity, or the 
consequence of a mitigation action, or the assembled consequences of all damages (the 
“impact”).  Performance indicators, at the component or the system level, depend on the 
type of analysis that is performed.  
In the following, the description of the vulnerability and loss models developed for each 
of the three selected case studies of geographically distributed CIs, i.e. CI-B1: Major 
Hydrocarbon Pipelines in Turkey, CI-B2: Gasunie National Gas Storage and Distribution 
Network in Holland and CI-B3: Port Infrastructures of Thessaloniki in Greece are 
provided. It is noted that certain components of CI-B3 have already been addressed in 
section 3 as part of individual, single-site infrastructures. 
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4.1 CI-B1: Major Hydrocarbon Pipelines in Turkey 
4.1.1 Vulnerability models 
The major hydrocarbon pipelines in Turkey consist of continuous buried steel pipes with 
welded connections. Such high quality pipes are not much sensitive to wave propagation 
(WP) hazard since the induced strains due to wave propagation is very low as compared 
to the permanent ground deformation (PGD) hazard. The potential damages of pipelines 
can be assessed using fragility functions, which relate the pipeline damage rates to 
different level of seismic intensity. The damage rates of buried pipes are often defined as 
the number of pipe repairs (RR) per unit length of pipeline, while the seismic intensity is 
quantified via a series of ground motion parameters calculated with seismic records. The 
few available empirical fragility relations for welded-joint continuous steel pipelines are 
reviewed in Kakderi et al. (2015). In order to access the seismic performance of buried 
hydrocarbon pipelines due to fault offset, the existing fragility functions are not 
adequate. Therefore, new fragility relations are developed based on nonlinear numerical 
analysis of the pipe and the surrounding soil (Salzano et al. 2015). 
4.1.2 Performance and loss assessment 
A full probabilistic risk assessment of pipeline failure at fault crossings is developed for 
the performance and loss assessment of the CI-B1. The seismic risk of pipeline failure is 
expressed as the annual probability of pipeline failure at crossings. Through case studies, 
a set of key parameters has been investigated about the impact on the seismic risk of 
pipeline failure due to fault displacement. Two important aleatory uncertainties from 
earthquakes are considered during the risk analysis: fault displacement and fault-pipe 
crossing angle. The influence of these uncertainties on the risk of pipe failure at strike-
slip fault crossings is studied. Uncertainty of pipeline parameters and soil, such as soil 
property, can also be taken into account in the pipeline failure risk. The seismic risk of 
pipeline failure due to the actual fault rupture occurring at a distance far away from the 
mapped fault trace is also examined. This quantitative risk can be used as a useful 
reference for engineers to design and retrofit pipes at fault crossings. 
4.2 CI-B2: Gasunie National Gas Storage and Distribution 
Network in Holland 
4.2.1 Vulnerability models 
For the Gasunie gas pipelines, the specific mechanism of soil liquefaction and 
corresponding lateral displacements is investigated as it is identified as one of the main 
failure mechanisms for the pipelines. Taking into account the scarce available damage 
data for these conditions, numerical analyses were conducted to develop fragility 
functions (Miraglia et al. 2015). Regarding the Gasunie processing stations, some of 
them are open while others are housed in buildings. Most buildings are relatively new 
and regular, either masonry or concrete. Following Gehl et al. (2014), a fault-tree 
decomposition of the sub-components was used to assess the relative vulnerability of 
these stations. 
4.2.2 Performance and loss assessment 
For the CI-B2, dedicated performance indicators should express the character of supply 
and demand of gas delivery as well as the presence of redundancies. Hence, focus is 
Distributed critical infrastructures 
 27 
 
given on connectivity analysis and capacity analysis (apart from mere physical damages 
of the components of the systems) and appropriate performance indicators, such as 
Serviceability loss (SR) and Connectivity loss (CL), could be used. The backbone of the 
proposed performance and risk assessment is the methodology of SYNER-G (Pitilakis et 
al. 2014b). The methodology was also followed by Esposito et al., 2015 for the seismic 
risk analysis of gas distribution networks. It includes the “Shakefields” method 
(Weatherill et al. 2014) for maps of sampled correlated seismic intensities at the sites of 
the nodes and branches in the gas distribution network. The gas distribution network 
itself is modelled as a graph composed by the set of nodes connected by edge links 
amongst each other. The stations, regulators groups and joints are thus represented by 
nodes while pipes are represented by links. Through MC sampling of events, annual 
exceedance curves of the performance indicators are calculated, making use of fragility 
curves for pipelines and stations.  
4.3 CI-B3: Port Infrastructures of Thessaloniki in Greece 
4.3.1 Vulnerability models 
Regarding the port infrastructures of Thessaloniki, existing seismic fragility functions for 
the most critical components to the functionality of the port, namely waterfront 
structures (e.g. NIBS 2004; Ichii 2003 and 2004; Kakderi and Pitilakis 2010; etc.) and 
cranes (e.g. NIBS 2004; Kosbab 2010), exposed to seismic hazards (ground shaking and 
liquefaction) were reviewed in Kakderi et al. (2015). Fragility functions for other 
components, e.g. building structures, liquid facilities etc., can be found in Pitilakis et al. 
(2014a). Finally, in the framework of STREST (Karafagka et al. 2016; Salzano et al. 
2015) new analytical tsunami fragility curves for buildings of various typologies and 
container cranes infrastructures were constructed as part of the CI-B3 case study (see 
section 3.3). 
4.3.2 Performance and loss assessment 
For the assessment of complex system performance such as port facilities, contributions 
of all components, and their interactions, have to be appropriately accounted for. For the 
case of the CI-B3, a specific methodology and tools are proposed for the assessment of 
the systemic performance and loss of harbours, simulating port operations and 
considering also the interactions among the main port elements. Performance and loss 
assessments are based on the general framework of SYNER-G. This methodology 
potentially accounts also for epistemic uncertainty, taking into consideration uncertainty 
in models’ parameters (through a hierarchical acyclical chain of probabilistic 
distributions). In addition, it can be applied within techniques like Logic Trees or 
Ensemble Modelling (see D3.1, Selva et al. 2015) to quantify also epistemic uncertainty. 
The methodology has been originally designed for seismic hazard (Cavalieri et al. 2012; 
Argyroudis et al. 2015), and was extended for tsunami hazard (Pitilakis et al. 2016). The 
functionality of the harbour is assessed through system-level Performance Indicators 
(PIs), which are related to the containers and cargo traffic. The analysis is based on an 
object-oriented paradigm where systems are described through a set of classes, 
characterized in terms of attributes and methods, interacting with each other. The 
objective of the analysis was to evaluate probabilities or mean annual frequency of 
events defined in terms of loss in performance of networks. 
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5. Multiple-site, low-risk, high-impact, non-nuclear critical
infrastructures
STREST Deliverable 4.3 (2015) provides a framework for the performance and 
consequences assessment of multiple-site, low-risk high-impact non-nuclear critical 
infrastructures subjected to strong ground shaking during earthquakes. Industrial 
districts have been selected as an example of this type of non-nuclear critical 
infrastructure for the purposes of the aforementioned guidelines. Precast concrete 
warehouses that are typically found in industrial districts in Europe, and that have 
demonstrated high levels of damage in past earthquakes (described further in STREST 
Deliverable 2.3, 2014) have been used as an application of the guidelines. Damage to 
these buildings can affect the structural system, the non-structural components (such as 
the external cladding), and the contents of the building, thus leading to a number of 
direct economic losses and the time required to repair the damage leads to additional 
business interruption losses, all of which are covered in the guidelines.   
5.1 CI-C1: Industrial district, Italy 
5.1.1 Structural and non-structural fragility 
Building typologies 
Three different classes of typical European precast warehouse buildings, which represent 
the majority of precast buildings in the Tuscany region, have been considered in the 
guidelines. 
Buildings in all the considered building classes consist of parallel portals composed of 
beams placed on corbel connections at the top of the columns. A neoprene pad is usually 
inserted between the elements and, depending on the building class, additional dowels 
are provided. Columns are fixed at the bottom by socket foundations. Parallel portals 
support a roof system, which is an assembly of precast elements (girders, TT slabs, 
hollow core slabs), and, in the case of a seismic event, does not behave as a rigid 
diaphragm (Magliulo et al. (2014), Liberatore et al. (2013), Casotto et al. (2015) and 
Belleri et al. (2014)).  
Within the considered building classes there are two types of structural configuration: 
type 1 (building class 1) and type 2 (building classes 2 and 3). Buildings with type 1 
structural configuration (Fig. 5.1a) contain long saddle roof beams, whereas type 2 
structural configuration (Fig. 5.2b) is distinctive of buildings with shorter rectangular 
beams and larger distance between the portals. Depending on the time of construction, 
the code level of a building class is either pre-code (building classes 1 and 2) or low-code 
(building class 3) for buildings built before or after 1996, respectively. Pre-code buildings 
were designed to withstand lateral load equal to 2 percent of the building self-weight, 
whilst design lateral load of low-code buildings amounted to 7 percent of the building 
self-weight. Moreover, due to different requirements in the design regulations it was 
assumed that beam-to-column connections in the pre-code buildings depended only on 
friction, whereas additional dowels were assumed to be implemented in the beam-to-
column connections of the low-code buildings. For more information about the building 
classes, the reader is referred to Casotto et al. (2015) and STREST Deliverable 4.3 
(2015). 
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Fig. 5.1  Structural configuration of Italian precast warehouses 
Furthermore, the most common types of claddings in precast buildings in the Tuscany 
region (Regione Toscana direzione generale politiche territoriali n.d.), i.e. vertical precast 
panels, horizontal precast panels and concrete masonry infills, were considered. In 
combination with the three building classes, these non-structural components defined 
eight subclasses.  
Vertical and horizontal panels are stiff elements, attached, respectively, to the beams 
and columns (Isaković et al., 2012). Their seismic performance is mainly dependent on 
the fastenings, which are provided at the top of the panels in order to prevent the panels 
from overturning. Fastenings may fail due to large relative displacements between the 
panels and the structure or due to inertial forces perpendicular to the plane of the 
panels. 
Concrete masonry infills are usually situated between columns (Regione Toscana 
direzione generale politiche territoriali n.d.). Due to a poor connection with the adjacent 
beam, negligible vertical load is transmitted from the roof, which can lead to the infills 
overturning. Such failures were observed after recent Italian earthquakes (Belleri et al., 
2014). For more information about the considered non-structural components the reader 
is referred to Babič and Dolšek (2016) and STREST Deliverable 4.3 (2015). 
Numerical models 
Numerical models of precast buildings have been developed in the OpenSees finite 
elements platform (McKenna and Fenves, 2010). The models consist of portals, 
connected by the roof system. Different non-structural elements can be attached to the 
portals using springs, which are added to the model in the form of one-dimensional and 
zero-length elements.  
Each portal is composed of columns and beams. Columns are modelled by one 
component lumped plasticity elements. Beams are modelled as elastic elements 
connected to the columns by the contact zero-length elements based on Mohr-Coulomb 
frictional law, thus allowing the beams to slip from the columns, while considering 
interaction between accelerations in vertical and horizontal directions. In addition to the 
contact element, an elastic no-tension spring with an initial gap is modelled between a 
column and a beam to emulate the possible impact between the two elements. In the 
case of low-code structures, dowels are modelled in each beam-to-column connection 
with an additional shear spring, which is removed from the model during the analysis, if 
the strength of the dowels is attained. The roof system is modelled by truss elements, 
resulting in a flexible performance. 
In the in-plane direction (parallel to the plane of the panels) vertical panels are modelled 
as non-linear springs connecting beams to fixed nodes. In the out-of-plane direction 
(parallel to the plane of the panels) vertical panels can be modelled independently as 
nodal masses connected to the beams by linear springs.  
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Horizontal panels can be modelled by elastic elements with high stiffness, which are 
attached to the columns (Fig. 5.2). The mass can be lumped at the centre of each panel. 
The vertical connections at the bottom (corbels) can be modelled as contact zero-length 
elements based on Mohr-Coulomb frictional law. Sliding of the panels is allowed in the 
in-plane direction, whereas displacements in the out-of-plane direction are prevented by 
an additional elastic spring. Moreover, the in-plane drifts are limited at the end of the 
gap provided for the panel installation by an additional elastic no-tension spring. At the 
top of each panel, panel-to-structure connections (either sliding or pinned) in the in-
plane direction can be modelled by non-linear springs. In the out-of-plane direction 
fastenings are modelled by an elastic spring with high stiffness, which prevents 
displacements. 
 
Fig. 5.2  A schematic illustration of numerical model of a building with horizontal panels 
Masonry infills can be modelled by stiff elastic elements and zero-length elements. The 
mass may be lumped at the centre of the infill. The infill-to-foundation connection can be 
modelled by two elastic no-tension springs, thus allowing rocking of the infill in the out-
of-plane direction. Connections to the adjacent columns are modelled by the impact 
zero-length elements, which are able to capture frictional effects in the out-of-plane 
direction and impact in the in-plane direction. Note that in buildings with masonry infills, 
an additional plastic hinge is placed at the infill-column joint at the top of the infill to 
capture the non-linear behaviour of the column.  
For more information about the numerical models the reader is referred to Babič and 
Dolšek (2016) and STREST Deliverable 4.3 (2015). 
5.1.2 Contents fragility 
The most commonly damaged contents in industrial buildings have been found by Porter 
et al. (2012) to be: 
o Fragile stock and supplies on shelves 
o Computer equipment 
o Industrial racks 
o Movable manufacturing equipment. 
A simplification of the procedure in ATC-58 (ATC, 2012) as proposed by Porter et al. 
(2012) is recommended in the guidelines for large industrial districts. The ATC-58 
damage-analysis procedure provides component damage in discrete damage states 
using fragility functions derived from experiments, earthquake experience, first 
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principles and, in some cases, expert judgment. Porter et al. (2012) have taken the 
fragility functions from ATC-58 that most closely fit the contents typologies described 
above, leading to proposed lognormal distribution parameters. In some cases the 
restraint of the contents (poor, moderate or superior) can also be accounted for. The 
intensity measure type in all cases is peak floor acceleration (in g), which in the case of 
single storey industrial buildings can be taken as the peak ground acceleration.  
5.1.3 Vulnerability models 
Once fragility functions for structural/non-structural components and contents have been 
developed, the next stage is to transform these into vulnerability functions, which 
describe the probability of loss conditioned on a level of ground shaking. This is done 
through damage-loss models. 
The damage-loss models for structural and non-structural components are defined by 
damage factors corresponding to designated damage states. Damage factors for 
structural components refer to the portion of construction cost of the bearing structure 
(without non-structural components) that is required to repair the damage state. These 
damage factors also account for additional costs dues to demolition and removal of 
debris, where necessary. Damage factors for non-structural components refer to the 
portion of construction cost of the non-structural components required to repair the 
damage. 
For contents, there is only one damage state for each component and the consequence 
of damage is that the component must be replaced, hence the mean damage factor is 
100%. If the structure collapses, then the damage factor for contents is assumed to be 
100%.  
Business interruption (or downtime) is defined as the time needed to repair building 
damage, and has been divided into the following two components, following the 
recommendations of Mitrani-Reiser (2008) and Terzic et al. (2015): 
o Mobilisation time (i.e. the time to undertake damage assessment, consultations 
with professional engineers, the contractor bidding process, debris clean-up, 
financing, contractor mobilisation etc. that needs to be completed before repairs 
can begin). 
o Repair time (i.e. the time to return the structure to its pre-earthquake condition). 
The financial loss due to this time may arise due to the loss in income from renting the 
damaged facility or the loss of daily revenue of the business. Additionally, in the case 
that the owner of a business is located in the facility, additional losses due to relocation 
cost and renting of new facilities may need to be considered. The potential sources of 
loss will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and used to define the business 
interruption value in the exposure model. 
For each damage states defined for the structural and non-structural damage, it is 
expected that building and business owners will consult with local contractors to 
estimate the mobilisation and repair time. Given that these are uncertain quantities, 
both the mean and dispersion values will need to be estimated, based on empirical data, 
literature review of past case studies and expert judgement.  
5.2 Probabilistic multi-site loss modelling 
The output of a probabilistic multi-site loss assessment is a loss exceedance curve. Once 
stochastic event sets and associated ground-motion fields (for each event) have been 
computed, the intensity measure level at a given site in the exposure model is used to 
extract the loss ratio from each vulnerability function that has been defined for the 
industrial facility at that site. The loss ratios that are sampled for assets of a given 
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taxonomy industrial facility category at different sites can be considered to be either 
independent or fully correlated. The latter case might be chosen, for example, when all 
facilities have been constructed by the same contractor. The losses for a given industrial 
facility are calculated using all of the ground-motion fields, leading to list of events and 
associated structural/non-structural/contents loss ratios and downtime. The loss ratios 
and downtime are multiplied by the value of each specified in the exposure model and 
summed to give a total loss for the facility. For a given industrial facility, this list is then 
sorted from the highest loss to the lowest. The rate of exceedance of each loss is 
calculated by dividing the number of exceedances of that loss by the total length of the 
stochastic event sets (in years). In the case where aftershocks are not included in the 
event sets, it is possible to assume a Poissonian distribution of the earthquake 
occurrence model and calculate the probability of exceedance of each loss accordingly. 
 
Fig. 5.3  A schematic illustration of numerical model of a building with horizontal panels 
If an aggregate loss curve for the whole portfolio of industrial facility is required, it is 
necessary to sum the losses from all the industrial facility in the exposure file, per event, 
before calculating the exceedance frequency of loss. All of these calculations can be done 
with the OpenQuake-engine, as described further in Silva et al. (2013) and Crowley and 
Silva (2013). 
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6. Conclusions 
This reference report addressed guidelines for vulnerability assessment of critical 
infrastructures exposed to natural hazards. The work of WP4 started from the fact that 
vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructures to natural hazards, differently to 
ordinary structures, has to primarily target the cascading effects the natural event may 
induce, as they are generally the main loss drivers. Although the interested reader is 
referred to the WP4 deliverables for further insights, the main conclusions from the 
discussed efforts may be listed as follows: 
1. A common approach to taxonomy, which is the basic component of vulnerability 
assessment, may be addressed for all typologies of CIs considered; 
2. In more general terms, it appears that a common probabilistic framework may be 
applied independently of the specific features of the considered infrastructure and 
may be applied also to systems of interdependent infrastructures; 
3. However, the models needed to put this vulnerability assessment in practice are 
mostly lacking, this applies especially for natural hazard different for the seismic 
one (although also the seismic case is far to be complete for many situations); 
4. For the same reason as #3, also models to consider multi-event and/or multi-
hazard loss assessment is far to be addressed, although the track on which such a 
research should develop appears clear at this point. 
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